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TO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
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INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0035
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 MEXICO 001344

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT KEN MCKUNE; NCTC; DHS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: ASEC CVIS ECON KVPR MX PGOV PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: RESPONSE UPDATE: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST
GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING
AND SHARING

REF: STATE 00032287

Classified By: Charles Barclay, Political Counselor for
reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Below please find Post's updated responses regarding
host
government's policies toward and capabilities for collection
of biographic and biometric data for terrorist screening
purposes.
The responses are keyed to the questions per reftel. All
questions
are included but only updated responses and additions are
annotated.

¶A. Watchlisting:

-- If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many
records
does the watchlist contain, and how many are
terrorist-related?

NO CHANGE

-- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist?

NO CHANGE

¶B. Traveler Information Collection:

-- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates,
etc.)
on collecting information from travelers arriving in the
country?

(ORIGINAL) THE MEXICAN NATIONAL IMMIGRATION INSTITUTE (INM)
COLLECTS
TRAVELER INFORMATION FROM TRAVELERS ARRIVING IN THE COUNTRY
VIA AIR.
ON ARRIVAL AT MAJOR AIRPORTS, INM SCANS INFORMATION FROM
PASSPORTS
AND COLLECTS DATA ON AIRLINE, FLIGHT NUMBERS, DATES OF ENTRY
AND
EXIT, DATE OF BIRTH, LAST NAME, TYPE OF TRAVEL DOCUMENT
PRESENTED,
PASSPORT NUMBER, AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.

(UPDATE - ADDITIONAL) AT THIS TIME SIOM (SISTEMA INTEGRAL
OPERACION MIGRATION)
IS AVAILABLE AT 13 AIRPORTS AND 2 SEA PORTS. THROUGH THE
MERIDA INITIATIVE
ALL PORTS OF ENTRY WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH SIOM. THE SYSTEM IS

SIMILAR TO
USVISIT USED BY CVP AT ALL P.O.E.

-- Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry
and
for domestic flights?

NO CHANGE

-- Who collects traveler information?

NO CHANGE

-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share
that
information with foreign governments?

NO CHANGE

-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record
(PNR)
data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Is this data
used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes to screen
travelers? Does host government have any existing treaties to
share PNR data?

NO CHANGE

-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems
(APIS), interactive advanced passenger information systems
(IAPIS), or electronic travel authority systems been
effective at

detecting other national security threats, such as wanted
criminals?

NO CHANGE

¶C. Border Control and Screening:

-- Does the host government employ software to screen
travelers
of security interest?

NO CHANGE

-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only non-host-
country nationals? What is the frequency of travelers being
"waived through" because they hold up what appears to be an
appropriate document, but whose information is not actually
recorded electronically? What is the estimated percentage of
non-recorded crossings, entries and exits?

(ORIGINAL) GOM TRACKS ALL INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVELERS
ELECTRONICALLY,
BUT NOT DOMESTIC AIR TRAVELERS. AIR TRAVELERS ARE TRACKED
ELECTRONICALLY ONLY ON ENTRY INTO THE COUNTRY, BUT TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS ARE GENERALLY NOT VALIDATED ON EXIT. AS OPPOSED TO
AIR TRAVEL, TRAVELERS ENTERING BY LAND OR SEA ARE NOT
ACTUALLY
SCREENED NOR RECORDED ELECTRONICALLY AND ARE FREQUENTLY
"WAIVED
THROUGH." THE PERCENTAGE OF NON-RECORDED CROSSINGS, ENTRIES
AND EXITS IS NOT KNOWN.

(UPDATE - ADDITIONAL) ALL THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS (TCN) NEED
NEED TO REGISTER WITH INM

-- Do host government border control officials have the
authority
to use other criminal data when making decisions on who can
enter
the country? If so, please describe this authority
(legislation,
mandates, etc).

NO CHANGE

 -- What are the host government's policies on questioning,
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting
themselves
at a point of entry into the country? Which agency would
question, detain, or deny entry?

NO CHANGE

-- How well does information sharing function within the host
government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone
with a
valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism,
how is this communicated and resolved internally?

NO CHANGE

¶D. Biometric Collection:

-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? What
are the systems and models used?

NO CHANGE

-- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the
host government target a specific population for collection
(i.e.
host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection systems
look
for a one to one comparison (ensure the biometric presented
matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one to many
comparison (checking the biometric presented against a
database
of known biometrics)?

NO CHANGE

-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host government
know of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted
to

defeat biometric checkpoints?

NOT APPLICABLE.

-- What are the host government's policies on collecting the
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country?

NO CHANGE

-- Which agency is responsible for the host government's
fingerprint system?

NO CHANGE

-- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS,
UK1
or RTID compliant?

NOT APPLICABLE.

-- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which
agency collects the fingerprints?

NO CHANGE

¶E. Passports:

-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information, does the host government
share
the public key required to read the biometric information with
any other governments? If so, which governments?

NO CHANGE

-- Does the host government issue replacement passports for
full
or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the original
passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)?

(UPDATE) REPLACEMENT PASSPORTS ARE ISSUED FOR FULL VALIDITY.
PASSPORT
VALIDITY IS ONE YEAR FOR CHILDREN 5 YEARS AND YOUNGER, THREE
YEARS FOR
6-18 YEARS, SIX OR TEN YEARS BASED ON PAYMENT FOR 19 YEARS
AND
OLDER.

-- Does the host government have special
regulations/procedures
for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who
have reported their passports stolen multiple times?

NO CHANGE

-- Are replacement passports of the same or different
appearance
and page length as regular passports (do they have something
along the lines of our emergency partial duration passports)?

NO CHANGE

-- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or
fewer
biometric fields as regular-issue passports?

NOT APPLICABLE

-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the
number
of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel)
passports used to apply for U.S. visas?

NO CHANGE

-- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number
series or otherwise identified?

NO CHANGE

¶F. Fraud Detection

- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are
instances

of fraud involving documents followed up?

(ORIGINAL) MEXICAN FRAUD PREVENTION EFFORTS AT POINTS OF
ENTRY ARE
BELIEVED TO BE INCONSISTENT AND NOT TERRIBLY EFFECTIVE.
MANY SPECIAL INTEREST ALIENS USE FRAUDULENT PASSPORTS FROM
THIRD PARTY COUNTRIES.

(UPDATE - ADDITIONAL) A NEW MEXICAN PASSPORT ANTI-FRAUD UNIT
WITHIN
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE (PGR) IS BEING CREATED TO
INVESTIGATE
PASSPORT FRAUD. THERE IS NO TIMETABLE OR INDICATION FROM PGR
WHEN THIS UNIT WILL BE OPERATIONAL

(UPDATE - ADDITIONAL) - CBP IN CONJUNCTION WITH FPU PROVIDE
CONTINUED
TRAINING TO INM/SSP AND PFP OFFICERS.

-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken
out
of circulation, or made harder to use?

(ORIGINAL) THESE DOCUMENTS ARE CONFISCATED BY THE NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION
INSTITUTE (INM) DURING DETENTION. THE LEGITIMACY OF BIRTH
CERTIFICATES, VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARDS, OR PROFESSIONAL
LICENSES (CEDULAS PROFESIONALES) MAY BE CHECKED THROUGH
MEXICAN CIVIL
REGISTRIES OR ON-LINE DATA BASES.

(ORIGINAL) WHILE THE MEXICAN PASSPORT ITSELF IS VERY SECURE,
FPU
AMBEMBASSY MEXICO CITY HAS A NUMBER OF CONCERNS REGARDING THE
SECURITY
OF THE APPLICATION PROCESS ITSELF. MEXICAN PASSPORTS ARE
ISSUED BY 113 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES,
NON-MEXICANS HAVE ACQUIRED VALID MEXICAN PASSPORTS WITH FALSE
DOCUMENTATION. FPU MEXICO CITY IS WORKING WITH THE
SECRETARIAT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (SRE) TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AND TO
ESTABLISH A
FRAUD PREVENTION PROGRAM WITHIN SRE.

(UPDATE -ADDITIONAL) GENUINE MEXICAN PASSPORTS ARE EASY TO
OBTAIN
WITH FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS WITH NO ADDITIONAL RIGOR FOR TCN

¶G. Privacy and Data Security

-- What are the country's policies on records related to the
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered
at
points of entry into the country? How are those records
stored,
and for how long?

NO CHANGE

-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or
use
of sensitive data?

NO CHANGE

-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public
on
the implementation of new databases of records?

NO CHANGE

-- Are there any laws relating to security features for
government computer systems that hold personally identifying
information?

NO CHANGE

-- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access
data
that homeland security agencies hold about them?

NO CHANGE

-- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of

birth,
etc.) versus case files (for example, records about
enforcement
actions)?

NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME.

-- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the
government to obtain these types of data?

NO CHANGE

¶H.   Immigration Data Bases:

--   What computerized immigration databases are used to track
entries and exits?

NO CHANGE

--   Is the immigration database available at all ports of
entry
(POEs)?

NO CHANGE

--   If immigration databases are available at some POEs,
but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs
will
receive the tool?

NOT APPLICABLE.

--   What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the
systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts,
budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.?

NO CHANGE

--   How often are national immigration databases updated?

NO CHANGE

¶I.   Watchlist and Information Sharing:

--   Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen
travelers at POEs?

NO CHANGE

--   What domestic sources of information populate the
name-based
watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts,
criminal wants/warrants?

NO CHANGE

--   What international watchlists do the host government use
for
screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN,
etc.?

NO CHANGE

--   What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist
between host government and its neighbors?

NO CHANGE

¶J. Biometrics:

--   Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air,
land,
sea)? If no, does host government have plans to install such
a
system?

NO CHANGE

--   If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not
all,
how does the host government decide which POEs will receive
the
tool?

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NOT APPLICABLE.

-- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host
government
use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial recognition, iris
recognition, hand geometry, retinal identification, DNA-based
identification, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis? Are the
systems ICAO compliant?

NOT APPLICABLE.

-- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information? If e-Passports are issued,
what biometric information is included on the document, i.e.
fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc? If not, does host
government plan to issue a biometric document in the future?
When?

NO CHANGE

¶K. Identifying Appropriate Partners:
Department would appreciate post's assessment of whether host
government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing.
Considerations include whether host government watchlists may
include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition to
terrorists), and whether host governments would share or use
U.S.
watchlist data inappropriately, etc.

-- Are there political realities which would preclude a
country
from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement with the
U.S?

(UPDATED) WITH THE ADOPTION OF THE "MERIDA INITIATIVE"
INFORMATION SHARING
ACROSS AGENCIES INCLUDING THE MILITARY HAS OCCURRED AT
UNPRECEDENTED
LEVELS. AS PART OF THE MERIDA INITIATIVE A PACKAGE OF
AGREEMENTS ARE
BEING NAGOCIATED FOR OFFICIAL INFORMATION SHARING BUT NO
TIMETABLE HAS
BEEN DISCUSSED ON ROLLOUT. LACK OF THESE OFFICIAL AGREEMENTS
HAS NOT RESTRICTED THE RECENTLY ENHANCED EFFORTS TO GATHER
AND PROVIDE INFORMATION
RECIPROCALLY.

-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed
to
adequately provide safeguards for the protection and
nondisclosure of information?

NO CHANGE

-- How much information sharing does the host country do
internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for
example? If not, do different ministries share information
amongst themselves?

NO CHANGE

-- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal
statutes that do so?

NO CHANGE

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BASSETT